When parties want to pay : comparing party-candidate linkage(s) and centralisation across India

Abstract

This article investigates how party finance shapes party-candidate linkages, focusing on two critical dimensions: candidate selection and candidate turnover. Existing research on ethnic clientelist democracies highlights ethnic proximity and wealth as key factors in candidate selection. In India, studies suggest that parties disproportionately rely on wealthy candidates to fund elections. This financial dependency constrains candidate renewal, limiting parties’ ability to counteract anti-incumbency, suppress dissent, and provide electoral opportunities to party activists. Given these dynamics, we investigate (1) how party finances affect the preference for wealthy candidates in shaping electoral outcomes ; and (2) how party finances shape candidate turnover. By doing so, we demonstrate that party finances are used both to secure electoral victories and to centralise political power by reducing the influence and autonomy of local elites and candidates. To explore these dynamics, we compare party systems in four states : Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Maharashtra, and Odisha ; since 2004, selected for their variation in party competition, candidate financing patterns, and electoral volatility.